一批由企业供给分部报告的特点是强制由IASB的国际财务报告准则通过滋扰（IASB 2012）。首先，分部报告必须审阅公司当前的货币地位和最终的观点，市场参与者有益。它必须是相关的，可比的和简单易懂的任何投资者有兴趣。分部报告泄露必须遵循的信息细节，测量有助于财务报表使用者，从而帮助他们作出可靠的决定。分部报告的基本功能是因此给相关决策的细节，任何人都需要它（Thomas W.T.，2000）。
在经济形势下，细分市场有两个基本功能。最初，它帮助利益相关者，债权人和投资者确定一个企业的价值，因此其通常的生产力，即分部报告的估值作用。其次，它有助于利益相关者和其他各种投资者跟踪他们的财务投资，即分部报告的管理职能。分部报告的这两个部分发生在两个不同的报告不对称的关注：最初，该公司的管理人员有更多的细节有关公司的潜力和去向比其他市场的个人。这种细节不对称会给局外人带来麻烦，在适当地评估一个公司未来的生产力，因此在成功的投资选择。分部报告的不对称与几个当代企业真相与二形式、利益相关者并不是从根本上治理一个企业。通常被称为“代理问题”的问题被认为是减少的数量和质量的细分披露提供给利益相关者。Ashbaugh H.和Pincus M.（2001）认为，由于上述信息不对称的问题，政策的反复修改。他们的主要工作是保护公司披露的某个阶段，并提高披露财务信息的质量。
A number of characteristics of the segmental reporting supplied by the firms are compulsory by the IASB via the nuisance of the IFRS (IASB 2012). Of all, segment reporting must be beneficial to market participants in reviewing a company spresent monetary position and eventual perspectives. It must be pertinent, comparable and simple to understand by any investor that is interested in it. The segment reporting divulged must be followed by informative details that is measured helpful to financial statement users, so as to assist them in making reliable decisions. The basic function of segmental reporting is consequently to give pertinent decision-making details to any person who could require it (Thomas W.T., 2000).
There’re two basic functions that the segment details could play in the economic situation. Initially, it helps stakeholders,creditors and investors to determine the value of a business and therefore its usual productivity i.e. the valuation role of segment reporting. Secondly, it helps stakeholders and various other investors in tracking the use of their financial investments i.e. the stewardship function of segment reporting. This double part of segmental reporting occurs in two different reporting asymmetry concerns: initially, the company’s managers have generally more details concerning the firm’s potentials and whereabouts than other market individuals. This sort of details asymmetry can create troubles to outsiders in evaluating appropriately a firm’s future productivity, and therefore in making successful investment choices. The second form of segment reporting asymmetry is linked with the truth that in several contemporary firms, stakeholders aren’t essentially administers of an enterprise. The issues that occur typically called “agency problems” are thought to lessen with the rise of the quantity and the quality of segment disclosures offered to stakeholders. Ashbaugh H. and Pincus M. (2001) argue that, because of the above information asymmetry concerns, policies are recurrently modified. Their main job is to protect a certain stage of disclosure by firms, and to boost the quality of the revealed financial information.