加拿大代写论文：中国企业的内部管理
加拿大代写论文：中国企业的内部管理
然而，在这段时间里，中国必须经历某些障碍。在对文章进行分析的基础上，中国企业所有权和控制权:中国企业治理和中国网通:中国公司治理(a)，这些障碍已被确定如下:
对国家所有权的高度集中:在上海证券交易所上市的公司中，有三分之二是国有企业。这可以被称为国家控制的经济的遗产(艾布拉姆等2008)。这一特殊问题已被确认为在这里列出的一系列障碍的主要来源。
这些措施包括董事会内部的独立性较低，以及内部人士的疯狂交易。它也对分散资源的资源产生了影响。这降低了资本市场的流动性，并阻碍了少数投资者长期投资于投资。然而，自从新改革的形成以来，少数股东的保护和安全得到了改善，但他们仍然很难对国有股东的事实提出异议。
董事会的独立性较低:这一特殊的障碍已被确定为集中于所有权的直接结果。由公司的主要股东选择和罢免董事会成员、监事会和公司董事会成员。这更经常是中国政府(艾布拉姆等人2008年)。由于这一点，董事们有更多的机会去执行信托责任;然而，董事们从高级管理人员和董事会中获得更高的独立性的机会就更少了。
加拿大代写论文：中国企业的内部管理
However, in this duration of time, China had to go through certain obstacles. On the basis of the analysis done on the articles, ‘Enterprise ownership and control in China: Governance with a Chinese twist,’ and ‘China Netcom: Corporate Governance in China (A)’, these obstacles have been identified as follows:
Immense concentration on ownership of state: Two-third of the corporations listed within the Shanghai Stock Exchange is enterprises of the state. This can be referred to as the legacy of the economy controlled by the state (Abrami et al. 2008). This particular issue has been identified as the main source of a number of obstacles for progressing listed here.
These include low level of independence amongst the Boards of Directors and rampant trading by insider. It also has an influence on the diversion of resources away from the companies. This reduces the rate of liquidity within the capital markets, and discourages minority investors to be engaged in investments on long-term basis. However, since the formation of new reforms, there has been an improvement in the protection and safety of minority shareholders, but it still remains hard for them to be disagreeing on the facts by state shareholders.
Low level of independence amongst the Boards of Directors: This particular obstacle has been identified as the direct outcome of concentration on ownership. Selection and removal of members from both, boards of supervisors and corporate boards of directors by the dominating owners of the organization. This is more often the government of China (Abrami et al. 2008). Due to this, there are more chances that the directors will be impeding to carry out the fiduciary duties; whereas, there are less chances that the supervisors will manage to exert improved level of independence from senior managers as well as board of directors.
